Armstrong v. Tygart | Lance Armstrong Responds to USADA’s Motion to Dismiss

by Renée Kolar

On Friday, August 3, 2012 Lance Armstrong filed a Memorandum in Opposition arguing that the court has jurisdiction to enjoin the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency’s (USADA) proceeding and requesting that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be denied. In his Memorandum, he asserts that Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) has exclusive jurisdiction over the matters in USADA’s charging letters and has not authorized USADA to pursue disciplinary action against him. Armstrong then proceeds to argue that (1) the Sports Act does not apply to his claims; (2) even if the Sports Act did apply, it would not preempt his claims; (3) he is not required to exhaust administrative remedies; and (4) he did not agree to arbitrate his claims against USADA. Below is a summary of his arguments.

UCI has jurisdiction, not USADA

Armstrong asserts that the court has jurisdiction to enjoin USADA’s arbitration proceeding against him and to require USADA to respect its obligation to abide by UCI’s decisions and governing rules. He contends that UCI has exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether to pursue charges against Armstrong and it has specifically asked USADA not to proceed with its charges against him. Armstrong claims UCI has exclusion jurisdiction under the World Anti-Doping Code (WADC) because (1) the charges involve samples collected by UCI; (2) alternatively, because UCI “discovered” the alleged violation; and (3) as a final alternative, because Armstrong is retired from cycling and UCI is the anti-doping authority that had results management authority at the time the athlete allegedly committed the violation. Armstrong also claims UCI’s exclusive jurisdiction based on the fact that UCI has not authorized USADA to proceed with disciplinary action.

The Sports Act Does Not Apply to Armstrong’s Claims

Armstrong asserts that the language of the Sports Act clearly indicates that it only applies to amateur athletes and certain amateur competitions. He claims that the Sports Act does not apply to his claims for three reasons. First, he argues that the professional cycling competitions that he competed in are not the Olympic Games, the Paralympic Games, the Pan-American Games, world championship competition, or other amateur competition covered by the Act. Next, he contends that he is not an amateur athlete and that under UCI and USA Cycling rules, he was a professional cyclist and a member of professional cycling teams. Finally, he argues that the Act only requires arbitration with National Governing Bodies (NGBs) and makes no reference to USADA or national anti-doping agencies.

Even If the Sports Act Applied, It Would Not Preempt Armstrong’s Claims

In the event the court finds the Sports Act does apply to the dispute, Armstrong contends the Act only preempts claims concerning eligibility to compete in certain competitions. He argues that since he is bringing common law and Fifth Amendment due process challenges, and not claims regarding his eligibility to compete, his claims should not be preempted by the Act.

He further asserts that his claims should not be preempted because federal courts may prevent private entities from “violating governing rules or imposing arbitrary and unreasonable disciplinary procedures when valuable property interests are at stake.” Armstrong alleges that USADA has violated its own rules and brought charges that are clearly outside its jurisdiction and that UCI has not authorized USADA to pursue. Armstrong argues that the court has jurisdiction to review USADA’s conduct in order to ensure that it follows the applicable rules.

Finally, Armstrong argues that USADA’s preemption argument should be rejected because his claims cannot be preempted under Article III of the Constitution. He contends that generally, Congress may not, without violating Article III, “withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law.” Armstrong asserts therefore that his common law due process and tortious interference claims must be adjudicated by an Article III court. He adds further, that the Sports Act does not reflect a clear intent to preclude judicial review of a constitutional due process challenge.

Armstrong Is Not Required to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

Armstrong argues that because the Sports Act does not apply, he does not have to exhaust administrative remedies. However, if the Sports Act does apply, Armstrong asserts that the court has jurisdiction to preclude private entities from violating governing rules or imposing arbitrary and unreasonable disciplinary procedures. Finally, Armstrong contends he is not required to participate in a proceeding over which USADA lacks authority before the Court can address USADA’s jurisdiction. Armstrong claims he is not required to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial intervention because he would open himself up to the argument that he waived his rights to challenge USADA’s jurisdiction, because he is challenging the constitutionality of those very proceedings, and because he will suffer irreparable injury if the Court does not enjoin USADA from proceeding.

Armstrong Did Not Agree to Arbitrate His Claims Against USADA

Armstrong contends that Defendants have the burden of proving an agreement to arbitrate exists. He asserts that his USA Cycling licenses or his inclusion in the USADA RTP do not establish that the USADA Protocol applies in this case. While USA Cycling did adopt the USADA Protocol, Armstrong claims that both USA Cycling and USADA are required to abide by the UCI rules and decisions and the WADC. He contends that by applying for an international cycling license after 2004 and the creation of USADA, he only agreed to the USADA Protocol to the extent that it is consistent with the governing UCI Anti-Doping Rules and the WADC, which take precedence over the Protocol.

According to Armstrong, under the governing rules, UCI has exclusive jurisdiction over this matter, the UCI Anti-Doping Rules apply, USADA has not been given authority to proceed, and UCI has twice directed USADA not to proceed, making the USADA Protocol and AAA Rules inapplicable to his case. Armstrong argues that if the AAA Rules do not apply then there is no contractual requirement that he arbitrate arbitrability.

Armstrong argues that he never contractually agreed to arbitrate his claims against USADA. He claims that USADA has the burden of proving an agreement to arbitrate either USADA’s Charges or the Claims in the Complaint and has failed to do so.

Related Posts:

• Armstrong v. Tygart | Fairness of Arbitration Procedure, Disputing, August 8, 2012
• Armstrong v. Tygart | Jurisdiction, Disputing, August 7, 2012
• Armstrong v. Tygart | Existence of Agreement to Arbitrate, Disputing, August 6, 2012
• The International Convention Against Doping in Sport of 2005, Disputing, August 2, 2012
• USADA Case against Lance Armstrong | USADA’s Successful Arbitration Track Record, Disputing, August 1, 2012
• USADA Case against Lance Armstrong | USADA Adjudication Process Part VI | Right to Appeal to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), Disputing, July 30, 2012
• USADA Case against Lance Armstrong | USADA Adjudication Process Part V |USADA Expedited Track, Disputing, July 26, 2012
• USADA Case against Lance Armstrong | USADA Adjudication Process Part IV | The Arbitration Hearing, Disputing, July 25, 2012
• USADA Case against Lance Armstrong | USADA Adjudication Process Part III | The Appointment of Arbitrators, Disputing, July 24, 2012
• USADA Case against Lance Armstrong | USADA Adjudication Process Part II | The Review Board Track, Disputing, July 23, 2012
• Armstrong v. Tygart | USADA Files Motion to Dismiss Lance Armstrong’s Suit , Disputing, July 21, 2012
• USADA Case against Lance Armstrong | USADA Adjudication Process Part I | USADA ‘Results Management,’ Disputing, July 19, 2012
• Armstrong v. Tygart | Texas Federal Court Will Hear Lance Armstrong Case on August 10, Disputing, July 18, 2012
• Armstrong v. Tygart | Lance Armstrong’s Suit and Restraining Order against USADA, Disputing, July 17, 2012
• USADA Case against Lance Armstrong | What is the USADA? Disputing, July 16, 2012
• USADA Case against Lance Armstrong | USADA Allegations, Disputing, July 13, 2012
• Lance Armstrong | The Doping Controversy Continues, Disputing, July 12, 2012

Renée Kolar is a summer intern at Karl Bayer, Dispute Resolution Expert . Renée is a J.D. candidate at The University of Texas School of Law and holds an undergraduate degree in Applied Foreign Languages from l’Université Stendhal in Grenoble, France.