Armstrong v. Tygart | USADA Files Motion to Dismiss Lance Armstrong’s Suit

by Renée Kolar

On July 20, the United States Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) filed its Motion to Dismiss Lance Armstrong’s Amended Complaint. (Read Motion to Dismiss here) In their motion, Defendants USADA and Travis Tygart, in his official capacity as the Chief Executive Officer of USADA, assert that the suit should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or, in the alternative, it should be dismissed or stayed under Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Below is a summary of their arguments.

I. The Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Under the Sports Act

Defendants argue that the Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act (The Sports Act), establishes arbitration as the exclusive forum for disputes relating to athlete eligibility in sports that are part of the Olympic movement, including cycling and triathlon. They contend that when drafting the act, Congress rejected proposed legislative provisions that would have created authority for the judicial system to become involved in issues related to amateur athletes, and instead gave the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) and National Governing Bodies (NGB)—like USA Cycling—exclusive jurisdiction over eligibility for competitions.

Defendants claim therefore, by virtue of his membership in USA Cycling (whose regulations incorporated USADA Protocol, including AAA arbitration), his obtaining an annual license through USA Cycling, and his inclusion in the USADA Registered Testing Pool (RTP), Armstrong, agreed to be bound by the USADA Protocol. Defendants assert that since Congress specifically provided that disputes of this nature should be resolved in arbitration, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Amended Complaint.

Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

Defendants argue in the alternative that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff has failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies under the Sports Act and USADA Protocol. They argue that courts interpreting the Sports Act have consistently held that a plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies before pursuing any court action against a NGB.

The Defendants assert that the Sports Act imposes on the USOC and its NGBs a requirement that they establish administrative procedures for, inter alia, the resolution of eligibility disputes between members and their NGBs. They claim that USA Cycling has complied by adopting regulations incorporating the USADA Protocol for all members and requiring all American cycling and triathlon athletes to respect and comply with the USADA Protocol. Defendants contend that Armstrong’s failure to exhaust his available administrative remedies leaves the Court without jurisdiction.

Armstrong’s Complaints about the Arbitral Process

Defendants briefly address Armstrong’s complaints of lack of due process in the American Arbitration Association (AAA) arbitral procedure. They assert that this “mistrust of the arbitral process” has been “undermined by [the Supreme Court’s] recent arbitration decisions” and that these claims must be arbitrated and the suit should therefore be dismissed.

II. Stay of Proceedings Pursuant to Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act

Defendants argue that, in the alternative, under Section 3 of the FAA, a trial court must grant a stay pending arbitration if the issues in a complaint are within the scope of an arbitration agreement. They acknowledge that, under the FAA, a court may have limited review over questions of arbitrability involving the existence of a valid agreement to arbitration. However, they contend that this limited review is not allowed if the parties’ agreement clearly and unmistakably provides that the question of arbitrability is to be arbitrated.

Defendants assert that, in this case, Plaintiff is bound by the USADA Protocol and thus the AAA arbitration provisions by virtue of his USA Cycling and USA Triathlon membership and license as well as by being in USADA’s RTP during the times he was alleged to have doped. They state the relevant AAA Rule provides, “the arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope or validity of the arbitration agreement.” They claim that numerous court decisions reviewing this exact provision have uniformly held it constitutes a clear and unmistakable agreement that all questions of arbitrability shall be decided in arbitration rather than court.

Defendants reason that since all of Armstrong’s challenges to arbitrability are matters for the arbitrators to decide in the first instance, dismissal is appropriate.

Related Posts:

• USADA Case against Lance Armstrong | USADA Adjudication Process Part I | USADA ‘Results Management,’ Disputing, July 19, 2012
• Armstrong v. Tygart | Texas Federal Court Will Hear Lance Armstrong Case on August 10, Disputing, July 18, 2012
• Armstrong v. Tygart | Lance Armstrong’s Suit and Restraining Order against USADA, Disputing, July 17, 2012
• USADA Case against Lance Armstrong | What is the USADA? Disputing, July 16, 2012
• USADA Case against Lance Armstrong | USADA Allegations, Disputing, July 13, 2012
• Lance Armstrong | The Doping Controversy Continues, Disputing, July 12, 2012

Renée Kolar is a summer intern at Karl Bayer, Dispute Resolution Expert . Renée is a J.D. candidate at The University of Texas School of Law and holds an undergraduate degree in Applied Foreign Languages from l’Université Stendhal in Grenoble, France.